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ABSTRACT
The article is the first serious attempt in South Africa and Africa in general to pro-
duce an Evidence-based Corruption Index in the country and the Continent. It be-
gins with a variety of internationally accepted definitions of corruption, followed by 
the widely accepted definitions of the phenomenon in the South African landscape. 
It includes widely accepted definitions from government and civil society sources.
The discourse of how can a comprehensive Evidence-based Corruption Index can 
be built with information available in South Africa begins with a critical view and 
analysis of existing and flourishing perception-based Indices. User’s Guide to meas-
uring corruption as structured by the United Nations Development Program Oslo 
Governance Centre in cooperation with Global Integrity, is utilised as a thinking 
basis in terms of the methodological approach upon which the proposed, planned, 
designed and implemented Evidence-based Corruption Index is produced.
A comprehensive categorisation of levels and general and specific acts of corrup-
tion outlines key elements of the Index as an integral part of the gist of corrupt 
categorisation. The methodological approach is based on an exhaustive scrutiny 
and dissection of anti- corruption and Section 9 institutions amongst others; con-
tent analysis of selected newspaper reports and personal interviews with senior 
administrators , politicians and consultants with direct and continuous involvement 
of the case study. The Evidence–based Corruption Index is then presented.
Keywords:  Evidence-based Corruption Index, corruption, newspaper reports, per-
sonal interviews
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INTRODUCTION
The first step to something new, especially dealing with the question of embedded cor-
ruption globally and in South Africa in particular is possibly as brave a step as this dared 
by of thousands of students in Paris shouting “ Be realistic , strive for the impossible” in 
1968. It is an extremely difficult task, some will say perhaps impossible.
To be sure for an answer one has to try, research, think, debate, re-think and decide. The 
first step, in itself a research experiment, will attempt to build such an Index having it as 
a center of analysis in a provincial Health Department.
Such an experiment demands serious, methodical, continuous and an all-encompassing 
research utilising a number of methodological tools, both qualitative and quantitative.
The present one will deal with corruption in the public sector only.
First of all the difficult task of defining corruption in most of its variations, types and forms.
The rest will follow.
CORRUPTION DEFINITIONS
The beginning is an inclusion of the most widely accepted and quoted definitions of 
corruption in a historical and presents perspective.
●● Corruption in its most general terms concerns acts or offences of dishonesty usu-
ally in the pursuit of personal gain on the part of the perpetrator.
●● The misuse of office for personal gain.
●● Personal gain as the foundation of the benefit of an individual or group holding 
political office.
●● Deceit on the part of a perpetrator to receive direct or indirect pecuniary or other 
benefit defrauding an organisation or entity.
●● Acceptance or extortion of material benefits by officials or private groups or indi-
viduals illegally.
●● Corruption occurs as a result of illegitimate collusion between members of the 
private or public sectors.
●● Political corruption is a variation of rent-seeking of individuals or groups using 
their political position to enrich themselves and takes a wide variety of forms 
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(Rose-Ackerman 1999; Spector 2005; Rose-Ackerman 2007; Shah 2007; Nuijten 
and Anders 2008; Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORRUPTION 
DEFINITION LANDSCAPE
The first fairly elaborate list of manifestations, types and forms of corruption at an official 
level was produced by the DPSA (Department of Public Service and Administration) in 
the context of the anti-corruption strategy adopted by the Department in 2002.
The forms, types and/or manifestations included were:
●● Nepotism
●● Conflict of interest
●● Abuse of power
●● Extortion
●● Fraud
●● Embezzlement
●● Favouritism
●● Abuse of privileged information /insider trading
●● Bribery
There have been a number of debates regarding the use of a number of the terms in the 
document such as the ‘abuse of power’ and the ‘conflict of interest’ as they have a wide 
variety of meanings and connotations especially in the public service. There have been 
questions for example on the direct or indirect relationship of the terms and realities 
of ‘nepotism’ and ‘conflict of interest’ and their ‘real differences’ in reality within the 
context of the public service (Department of Public Service and Administration 2002; 
Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
The PSC (Public Service Commission) has released a number of reports on ‘the most 
common manifestations of corruption’ of which the one published in 2011 is considered 
the most comprehensive.
It was based on an enumeration and categorisation of a wide variety of complaints re-
ceived by their hotline (NACH) (N=7 766) during a period of six years.
●● Social grant fraud
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●● Identity document fraud
●● Appointment irregularities
●● Procurement irregularities
●● Abuse of government resources
●● Unethical behaviour
●● Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing irregularities
●● Criminal conduct
●● Mismanagement of government funds
●● Criminal conduct
●● Fraud and bribery
●● Other
Fraud and bribery topped the list (19%) followed by government resources abuse (13%) 
and government funds mismanagement (11%).
These are very general, overlapping, conflated, and unclear but usable for comparisons 
at a number of levels.
The PSC’s contribution to measuring corruption is invaluable through their various re-
ports, especially those related public service misconduct in respect of finances.
Their classification is as follows:
●● Fraud
●● gross negligence,
●● corruption,
●● misappropriation and
●● theft,
●● abuse, and
●● Financial mismanagement (PSC 2008; 2011a; 2011b).
Corruption in the PSC’s sense in this case is directly related to financial misconduct, 
according to the PRECCA dictates.
In general both the DPSA report and PSC reports the term ‘corruption’ is used in a very 
broad sense.
Respected civil society organisation CORRUPTION WATCH, the South African arm of 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL has also provided its own corruption classification 
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extracted the items based on the anonymous calls to their anti-corruption line and their 
categories are:
●● Procurement corruption
●● Abuse of government resources by government official
●● Bribe
●● Corruption in employment
●● Bribe
●● Other
There is certainly overlapping between the categories with clarifications missing.
David Bruce in a seminal article categorises corruption in the public sector as follows:
Corruption in procurement which includes extortion and bribery, the involvement of 
the private sector with administrative officials; misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud 
or theft that includes abuse of telephones. The use of state resources to secure votes for 
a specific party or politician in local or other elections; petty cash fraud and fraud in 
general; nepotism in employment and promotions including favouritism and nepotism 
(Bruce 2012:15–28).
HOW CAN A COMPREHENSIVE EVIDENCE-BASED 
CORRUPTION/ANTI-CORRUPTION INDEX 
BE BUILT WITH THE INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA?
An evidence based Corruption/anti-corruption Index will be based on the power of ob-
jectively collected and corroborated data.
It will not be only about Corruption but Governance more broadly as corruption is al-
ways related and integrated into a specific governance framework.
The Anti-Corruption Center for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University 
(ACCERUS) collective work to date has been based on the empirical reality that corrup-
tion is a multi-layered, multi-cultural, and multi-faced phenomenon that is predominantly 
a symptom of human and social realities as well as failure in governance of entities and 
institutions, administrative, red tape, asset allocation, supply chain and organisational 
weaknesses in particular.
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It is driven through political, administrative, and private sector common interests that 
lead to corruption issues that have been un-tackled by official or other sources including 
all those already mentioned .
These ‘details’ can be better understood from the finding of a South African Public 
Service Commission research in 2009 which pointed out that 44% of public officials 
in the country of those interviewed believed that they should be allowed to accept gifts 
under certain circumstances (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
Corruption can be objectively measured in considerable detail, but it is a tough task with 
possibilities of a certain amount of bias in the final outcome; but it can be done.
This Index cannot become a reality without the absolute commitment and coopera-
tion of a number of state institutions and entities.
Table 1: Evidence based corruption index
Corruption Type Figures Comments (where applicable)
Theft 289 (31.1%) 
For cases of theft, (including medicine, 
cell phones, departmental property, 
cars, kitchen equipment)
Absenteeism 196 (21.1%)
Fraud 100 (10.8%)
(Including making use of government 
stamps to validate fraudulent 
birth certificates, misrepresenting 
educational qualifications, etc.)
Absent Without Leave 56 (6%)
Insubordination 44 (4.7%)
Negligence 44 (4.7%)
Supply Chain and Procurement Fraud 42 (4.5%)
Falsification of Records for Cash (Bribery) 36 (3.9%)
Desertion of Post 26 (2.8 %)
Misappropriation of Departmental Property 21 (2.3%)
Total of corruption acts 
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ON THE PERCEPTION-BASED INDICES
There is no doubt that TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (TI) is considered over the 
years a very significant factor in the fight against corruption globally, and its reports and 
interventions are widely read, quoted and debated. It is considered and in fact is a lead-
ing perception based index utilising 13 data sources in order to construct its Corruption 
Perceptions Index together with a number of other methodologies  associated with:
The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index; IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook; 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence; Freedom House Nations in 
Transit; Economist Intelligence Unit; African Development Bank Governance Ratings; 
Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey; World Economic Forum Executive Opinion 
Survey (EOS); Global Insight Country Risk Ratings; Political Risk Services; World Bank–
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 
and the Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators.
An exhaustive perusal of such annual reports has shown that all of them base their find-
ings on the impressions , perceptions, knowledge and assessment of groups of “country 
experts”, including local economists, “two experts per country,” and “ a variety of ex-
perts based primarily in London, but also in a number of cities such as Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Beijing and New York ”.
These expert groups are assisted by internationally-based groups of consultants, busi-
ness specialists many of them operating in-house, and over 4000 business executives, 
freelance operators and analysts, networks of 110 business executives in a wide variety 
of countries, and finally “over 2 000 experts and 66 000 other individuals from around 
the world” (Cobhan 2013:3).
(It is interesting to note that there are no state officials/representatives in these groups, 
basically meaning that the aggregation of interviewees’ responses result in perceptions 
lacking a sense of diversity).
Without denying the significance of the experts’ knowledge, experience and under-
standing of the realities of the respective countries it can be assumed that the statistical 
correlations regarding shared opinions are in most probability highly similar because of 
their positions in the private sector.
But the question is whether this shade of perceptions and opinions can provide the truth 
in terms of corruption in their countries.
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On the other hand the WIG (Worldwide Governance Indicators) (WGI) have utilised rule 
of law; control of corruption; political stability and absence of violence; regulatory qual-
ity; government effectiveness and voice and accountability as indicators of an “aggregate 
of good governance”.
These emanate from perceptions and knowledge of a large number of private sector 
entities, academic experts and a large quantity of sources of data produced by higher 
institutions of learning, think tanks, NGOs and auditing companies.
These groups base their research on a list of variables which are described as ‘independent 
from each other’ and the existing sources of data that are utilised which are the following:
●● WMO
●● Irregular Payments in Public Utilities;
●● GWP is corruption in government widespread?
●● Irregular payments in tax collection
●● Irregular payments for judicial decisions
●● Representative Sources;
●● CS Public Trust in Politicians;
●● Irregular Payments in Export and Import;
●● Irregular Payments in Public Contracts ;
●● EIU Corruption among public officials;
●● GCS Public Trust in Politicians;
●● State Capture;
●● Level of corruption between administrations and local businesses;
●● Level of corruption between administrations and foreign companies;
●● PRS Corruption ;
●● IPD Level of “petty” corruption between administration and citizens.
The findings are based on a composite combination of questions set in empirical studies 
by a wide variety of entities throughout the world:
In terms of non-representative sources questions include the involvement of members 
of Parliament in corruption; the involvement of legal officials; border and tax officials; 
how ethical, accountable and transparent are public servants; how much private sec-
tor companies pay public officials; how private sector companies bribe the judiciary, 
borders and the tax authorities; the effects of corruptions on one’s business; the office 
abuse of the prosecution office; how often a household bribes authorities; how cor-
rupt public institutions are; how corruption takes place in rural areas; how negative 
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are the consequences of corruption for foreign companies; what are the consequence 
of bribing officials for the economy of the country; what are the key factors leading to 
corruption of public officials; what are the consequences of corruption of the public 
sector; what are the repercussions of corruption in the private sector (Kaufmann et al. 
2010).
It is understandable that the Worldwide Governance Indicators have offered throughout 
the years a significant overview of a wide variety of perceptions of citizens in a much 
extended array of countries internationally.
The variety of questions as well as the methodology followed have received a series of 
research related criticisms.
The fundamental criticism revolves around the methodological complexities and the 
large number of sourcing combinations as well as the lack of conceptual clarity of key 
issues such as ‘good governance’ as well as the arbitrary nature of indicators such as 
‘environmental regulations hurt competitiveness’.
There is a critic pointing out that there is an absence of an underlying theory of “good” 
governance as no normative concept or unifying single theory exists able to distinguish 
between good or bad governance.
There is also the belief that there are ‘hidden biases’ in the WGI as it is written in such a 
way that the emphasis of a number of agencies relies more on the opinion of households 
instead of international experts.
The extensive utilisation of tens of different combinations of questions is seen as confus-
ing to interviewees as is the lack of continuation of reasoning in response to negative or 
positive answers to questions
There is criticism of ‘over-selling’ the concept and the methodology as “reliable measure-
ments of governance”, despite the fact that WGI relies heavily on the Gallup World Poll, 
a world-wide survey of households that does not even carry weights in response to four 
of the WGI data.
It has been written that in comparative terms the reports lack of conceptual clarity and 
examples point out amongst other things that:
●● The WGI existing are tautological.
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●● The aspects of governance and the existing indices emanating from the research 
reflect only perceptions, not realities.
●● Because of this reality such research cannot guide state policies or further serious 
academic research.
●● Such research and their findings are not helpful in understanding the realities of 
corruption in all sectors of society.
Given the length of many of these reports because of the abundance of questions, there 
is a serious call on the part of the critics, that the introduction and utilisation of qualita-
tive methodologies in the future is of key importance (Hopkin 2002, cited in Kurtz and 
Shrank 2007:542 ; Golden and Picci 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2006; 2007; Knack, S. 2006; 
Arndt and Oman, 2006; Olken 2006; Sapford 2006; Soreide 2006; Tresman 2007; Urra 
2007; UNDP 2008; Apaza 2009:142; Andersson and Heywood 2009; Kenny 2009:317; 
Tresman 2007; Hawken and Munck 2009:2; Transparency International 2009; 2010; 
Langbein and Knack 2010:351–352).
A USER’S GUIDE TO MEASURING CORRUPTION
The OGC (United Nations Development Program Oslo Governance Centre) in coopera-
tion with Global Integrity, an international non-governmental organisation produced in 
2008 a user’s guide in measuring corruption in collaboration with organisations through-
out the world that fight corruption internationally, including researchers and practitioners.
It paints a picture of corruption through a scientific dissection of a very wide range of 
different Indexes and perception approaches with a critical view and its final verdict is 
that corruption can be scientifically measured through utilisation of combined scientific 
methodologies.
Its key element identified is:
Composite indicators combining different methods of research techniques; objective 
indicators that include facts that cannot be disputed; perception–based indicators; un-
disputed corruption indicators; assessments that concentrate on corruption perpetrators; 
corruption indicator levels; pro-poor and gender-sensitive indicators; experience-based 
indicators based on peoples’ personal experiences; proxy indicators the aggregation 
of indirect phases and existence of corruption; output based indicators that attempt to 
dissect the consequences of corruption on society; input-based indicators that examine 
existing laws, rules and regulations in a country and governance. (UNDP 2008).
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BUILDING AN EVIDENCE-BASED CORRUPTION INDEX 
FOR SOUTH AFRICA: THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Having briefly examined the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the nationally and 
internationally quoted and widely accepted perception–based research and findings the 
reality of an evidence-based Corruption/Anti-Corruption Index will unfold.
Such an effort is not founded on the belief that the empirically based perception indices 
lack internationally credibility despite their critics, but that an evidence-based index will 
be based on a different methodological outlook.
Such an index when methodologically sound and having all available public primary 
sources at the researchers’ disposal will have a minimal margin of error.
The Index which is the outcome of such a research endeavour will not utilise exclusively 
standard measurements as they tend to treat corruption as a one-dimensional phenom-
enon that can vary in incidences between countries.
It is a composite index rooted on both qualitative and quantitative , measurable, evidence 
and internal/local assessments that will utilise a combination of approaches instrumental 
in widening the understanding of the ‘drivers’ of corruption within a specific state level 
or institution (local, provincial or national). It is a methodology that takes seriously into 
account the existing realities of history, culture, institutions, societal and economic reali-
ties that shape the dynamics of power relationship (UNDP 2008:25).
The Corruption Index is principally based on the truth that corruption is not a single-
dimension phenomenon as the previously mentioned South African attempts alluded 
to. It aspires to be based on a much broader corruption concept that deals with forms, 
types, perpetrators, relationships, processes, systems, types and corruption settings.
Quantity as a part of measurement in this exercise is important, but form is more 
so as corruption is not bribery and fraud alone; causal relations are crucial (Philp 
2015:19–20).
If the form of corruption is not identified even in its quantitative dimension, the 
magnitude of the challenge will be most likely lost. This means that the more empiri-
cally comprehensive the form is dissected especially in respect of the relationship 
between public and private actors, the more the understanding of corruption will 
occur (Hood 1991 4–5; Hood & Dixon 2015).
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The methodological and conceptual basis of the Index is rooted on the reality that a 
uni- dimensional definition and measurement distort the understanding of corruption 
because they ignore the variations of the phenomenon in terms of sectors, forms, levels, 
and organisational locations/settings.
Unless these realities are researched, examined and dissected methodically and in depth 
there will be no easy solutions in the fight against corruption because of the confusion, and 
misinterpretation of its nature, root causes prevalence and continuity in a particular setting.
In our view, this is the best way to fight corruption and its varieties within society, in 
the private and public sectors and amongst human, group, private, political, social and 
organisational vulnerabilities.
The issue of fraud and bribery that dominate significant policy, legal, regulatory and so-
cial terrains and societies are multi-dimensional because they take place globally under 
a multiplicity of circumstances, cultures, historical and present variables, political and 
social dynamics, social and group dynamics and power relationships.
There is a difference when a bribe takes place between a politician and a business owner 
in a particular organisational setting of the Supply Chain and Procurement Department 
from the one taking place in the same setting between the same business person and a 
senior administrator of the same entity.
The first one is ‘political corruption’, the second is ‘administrative’; but in the end they 
are both corrupt acts.
Thus, it can be understood that the Index will be based on a multidimensional approach.
It will involve a combination of available quantitative data where various corruption 
types and forms are evident which is related and take into account the public-private 
relationships as well as in-depth and largely qualitative interviews with people who have 
first-hand experience of corruption within their own organisational environment.
A meticulous dissection of official documents provides a measurement picture that is 
comparative and quantitative. Because of the fact that they are crucial in generating rat-
ings, such scores provide the ‘objective’, ‘composite’ picture. They are useful when they 
are interpreted appropriately within their existing context.
The analysis of corruption cases reported to and investigated by legal authorities, 
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anticorruption agencies, courts or private sector investigations/audits have the advantage 
of providing hard data founded on tangible and proven corruption cases.
On the other hand the deep honesty and intimate knowledge of a senior manager in 
a municipality or a provincial office who is devoted to a fair and integrity-driven in his 
commitment to fight corruption provides the ‘living experience’ of a ‘professional source’ 
that can be classified as an ‘objective source’ (Linde & Erlingsson 2013:587–578).
For the process to take place so that minimal margin of error can be achieved there are a 
number of factors that are imperative:
●● The key ‘gatekeepers’ (Treasury, PSC, SIU, NPA, SALGA, DPSA, and Auditor 
General amongst others) must agree to open their documentary evidence avail-
able such as scrutiny of human resources, SCM, asset allocation, and such other 
corrupt-prone evidence. So far there has been an agreement between SAICA and 
the Auditor General as a supporter of the initiative.
●● All layers of government must agree to cooperate, and in the process efforts for the 
gradual acceptance and even the necessity of three-layered INTEGRITY AWARDS 
can ensue.
●● A high degree of confidence on the part of both public and private sector on the 
bona fide of the exercise is of key importance in this instance.
●● It is important that institutional support from all layers of leadership is an integral 
part of a combined effort in convincing both the private and the public sector to 
cooperate in this pioneering effort.
The following empirical are the base of the preliminary and final reports (in order of 
importance, preference and utilisation in index measurements:
●● Objective Indicators
●● Minimal Perception-based Indicators
●● Output-based Corruption Indicators: de facto indicators.
●● Experience-based Indicators.
●● Integrity governance management.
●● Composite Indicators.
●● Input-based Corruption Indicators.
The Index is based on research covering the last five financial years.
The INDEX is based on the following:
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A comprehensive study of the following documents:
The Auditor General’s Reports; all Public Service Commission’s relevant documents; 
all Law Reports dealing with the subject of investigation; Annual Reports and relevant 
documents of SAPS; all available policy and developmental documents of the entity; the 
Annual Reports and relevant documents of NPA.; the Annual Reports and relevant docu-
ments of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMA); the Annual Reports and relevant 
investigative documents of SIU.
Content analysis of existing reports appearing in the print media over the last 5 years is 
the final leg of the research that focuses on corruption, fraud, bribery, supply chain and 
procurement as the key concepts. The analysis is based only on corruption cases that 
have been finalised, hence there is exclusion of cases that did not report-specific cases 
of corruption. The variables are those found in the context of the present article and 
identify acts, or/and relationships, settings and/or actors.
The study, dissection and analysis of the official documents assessed in the institutions 
named above are based on the methodological dictates of content analysis, followed 
through a meticulous categorisation
The same process is followed in the selective telephonic and personal interviews with 
key role players and analysts in the private and public sectors (Stemler 2001; Kimberly 
2002; Krippendorff 2004).
The ‘experience-based evidence’ consisted of eight interviews, six with administrative 
leaders in the sector, one senior politician of the ruling party and one consultant who has 
worked in the healthcare field for over 5 years. These were semi structured interviews 
with a group of people who have first-hand experience and knowledge and revolved 
around the forms of corruption their extent of corruption in the specific work setting all 
based on personal knowledge or experience in the last five years.
This included knowledge of direct or/and indirect relations of people or groups involved 
in corrupt acts including politicians, business people, suppliers, funders, senior or mid-
dle managers. They were corroborated with the existing quantitative items and material. 
Responses were coded and categorised accordingly in relation with the items already 
identified in the content analysis and these were informed by the existing conceptual 
framework including new items that arose out of the interviews. In terms of these cor-
ruption realities, ACCERUS research has identified a wide array of corrupt acts with 
fundamental tenets upon which the Index will be based.
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These will be utilised in measurements on occasions in a combined form.
LEVELS AND GENERAL CATEGORIES OF CORRUPTION
Grand corruption
Grand corruption takes place at the upper echelons of the political state apparatus and 
leads to direct and indirect of laws, politics and economic development. The culprits 
take advantage of laws and anti-corruption agencies’ weaknesses, inadequacies, and 
lack of capacity (Hale 2015; Bauhr, and Charron 2017:416–417).
Systemic corruption
Systemic corruption is rooted on weaknesses, inadequacies and lack of capacity of or-
ganisational systems and processes. It is encouraged by monopolistic power relations, 
impunity and lack of transparency and could be either decentralised or centralised in 
terms of functions (Persson et al. 2012:451–452; Lever 2014).
Bureaucratic corruption
It is associated with corruption associated with public servants operating at different 
organisational and professional levels and abuses their positions for their own personal 
benefit (Gould and Mukendi 2007:428; Nwankwo et al. 2015:680; Gans-Morse et al. 
2018: 173–174).
Political corruption
This is one of the most debated concepts in the corruption literature and is associated 
with the greed, avarice and irregular actions of politicians at different levels of position 
and authority.
Petty corruption
Petty corruption is associated usually with corrupt practices by middle and lower grade 
public servants who in most cases deal daily with the public (also described as ‘survival 
corruption’) (GAB The Global Anticorruption Blog 2017; Van Vuuren, no date; Stahl et 
al. 2017).
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Management Fraud
Management fraud is simply that corruption or fraud perpetrated by a wide range of 
managers and cuts across all of the above categories. Management fraud is also synony-
mous with “fraudulent financial statements” (McKinney 2004; Lyer and Samociuk 2006; 
Mbaku 2007).
Principal-Agent type corruption
This can be the creation of unnecessary ‘middlemen’/ ‘agents’ to facilitate deals/transac-
tions. The agent employed can be either an external or an internal party to the organisa-
tion (Miller 2005; 203–204; Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2013:102–103; GAB | GAB the Global 
Anticorruption Blog 2015).
Economic/Financial corruption
Economic crime and financial corruption are fairly encompassing terms given to any ac-
tivity which concerns perpetrators attempting to dishonestly and illegally seek economic 
benefit from another source.
Specific types of typical/common corrupt practices
When studying a listing of the various types of corruption, it is informative to bear 
in mind that there are a number of interpretations and misrepresentation of specific 
corrupt acts. There have been studies that indicate that asset misappropriation (which 
comprises various activities) to be the largest category of corrupt activities, while there 
have been others that believe that bribe and fraud are the most committed corrupt 
activities.
Employee-related Fraud/corruption
These include backdating salary increases; use of department credit cards for personal 
use; commission schemes; falsified wages; fake educational qualifications and falsified 
curriculum vitae; other misrepresentations of relevant personal information; irregular 
promotions; illegal gratuities; irregular loans; duplicated reimbursements; irregular 
bonuses; expense reimbursement schemes; payroll/remuneration scheme; fraudulent 
subsidy and travel claims; fictitious expenses; irregular promotions; patronage; irregular 
bonuses; nepotism (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
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Asset misappropriation
Larceny (theft): from cash on hand, from cash deposits received; Cash movements: 
unrecorded cash transactions, transactions in foreign currencies; inventory and other 
assets (e.g. stocks); theft of tangible assets; use of organisation’s equipment (or staff) 
for private purposes; assets purchases; asset transfers; inventory schemes; asset 
movements.
Debtors
Sales schemes; unrecorded or under-recorded sales; invoice kickbacks; credit notes and 
refunds; short deliveries; false invoices; discounts; diversion of payments; various use of 
bribes. (Gilander and Neselevska 2017).
Creditors
Shell companies; double billing; mispricing; fraudulent disbursements/payments; over-
payments; fraudulent credit notes; false refunds (In the case of imports these are primary 
methods used to smuggle capital out of developing countries) (Huefner 2011:123–124; 
Coenen 2012:234–250; Leuthner 2016).
Procurement fraud
Purchasing schemes
Fictitious invoices and quotes; fictitious invoices; discounts; ghost suppliers; and ma-
nipulated “preferred and ghost service providers”. (Mantzaris 2014a:67–89).
Various forms of bribery through mediators; violations of “preferential procurement” and 
“Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment” arrangements; policy.
Petty Corruption
Various forms of rent seeking , i.e. officials getting members of the public to pay them for 
the service they administer, for example: subsidies schemes; tax concessions; pensions 
schemes; fines, penalties etc.; issuing of identity docs, passports etc.; charging handling 
fees; bribes to process documentation; bribes to qualify for subsidies, grants, licences 
etc. (Angelucci and Russo 2015; Lambert-Mogilianci et al. 2015:353–354).
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Computer/IT Fraud/Corruption (cyber-crime)
Financial Statement Fraud, Schemes, Misrepresentation (Management crime)
The overstatement of assets and income through amongst others:
the understatement of liabilities and expenses through: false or omitted disclosures; 
improper revenue recognition: misclassification of gains; less-than-arms-length transac-
tions; revenue recognition in wrong period; improper income accounting; improper 
percentage-of-completion accounting; inadequate disclosure of related party transac-
tions; sham agreements inadequate or false disclosures.
Cross cutting a number of the above mentioned corruption related activities are those 
which are classified or defined as:
Bribery is one of the worlds (and especially its public sector component) most serious 
areas of corruption and is where many such acts take place – both big and small. While 
perhaps most prevalent in procurement transactions, it is in fact also found in many 
other areas of corruption (MBPC 2016; Mantzaris 2014b:82–83).
A “Quiet” service is a low level of corruption where public servants fail to deliver the 
service they are paid to deliver, for example: absenteeism by teachers, nurses, and gross 
laziness by police. Hospital staffs who steal drugs or baby milk, agriculture officials who 
dilute the state subsidised fertilizer (World Bank 2010; U4 2017).
THE CORRUPTION INDEX
In order to build the Index in such a way as to have minimal margin for error, the follow-
ing documents were scrutinised:
The Auditor General’s Reports
●● All Public Service Commission’s relevant documents
●● All Law Reports dealing with the Department’s cases
●● The Annual Reports and relevant documents of SAPS
●● The Annual Reports and relevant documents of the Health Department under 
investigation
●● The Annual Reports and relevant documents of the NPA
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●● The Annual Reports and relevant documents of the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (PMA)
●● • The Annual Reports and relevant investigative documents of SIU
The findings of the Index were based solely on objective indicators; output-based cor-
ruption indicators, i.e. de facto indicators; experience-based indicators; integrity gover-
nance management; composite indicators and input-based corruption indicators. 
Content analysis of over 145 reports that appeared in the print media over the past 5 
years was the final leg of the research that focused on corruption, fraud, bribery, supply 
chain and procurement as key concepts, amongst others.
The analysis was based only on corruption cases that have been finalised, hence 
there was exclusion of cases that did not report specific corruption. The variables 
used were those identifying types of corruption and settings.
The study, dissection and analysis of the official documents assessed in the institutions 
named above were based on the methodological dictates of content analysis, followed 
by meticulous categorisation. The same process was followed in the selected personal 
interviews with a number of key role players in the field (‘experience based evidence’).
The interviews were aimed directly at corroborating the existing quantitative items and 
material collected and/or add to the information already collected through the provision 
of tangible and concrete evidence.
The Department under investigation employs over 69 000 health workers and pro-
vides health services to over 20 million patients for Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. 
It receives 400 000 calls to emergency medical services, and 5 million patient visits to 
hospital outpatient departments in addition to those trauma patients seen at the Accident 
and Emergencies (Gauteng Provincial Department of Health 2017).
A number of milestones have been achieved in the province through the expansion of 
the Ward Based Primary Health Care Outreach Teams, with the number of teams in-
creasing by over 38% from the previous year and their coverage expanding by 39% from 
316 to 439 wards.
The Department includes 3 Tertiary Hospitals, 3 District Hospitals, 9 Provincial Regional 
Hospitals, 4 National Central Hospitals, 373 Clinics, Nursing Training Colleges and 
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Ambulances. Its budget in the current financial year is R37b with the bulk going towards 
Tertiary and Central Hospitals (R13b) and District Health Services (R12b). In the previous 
financial year, it employed 56 314 staff members (Gauteng Provincial Department of 
Health 2017).
The Department has a qualified audit in 2013–2014 (Auditor General 2014) while dur-
ing the next financial year an amount of R1 201 597 000 was recorded for payables 
which exceeded the payment term of 30 days and no concrete evidence was produced 
for the Auditor General regarding goods and services valued below R500 000 (Auditor 
General 2015).
During the next financial year services and goods valued at above R500 000 were pro-
cured without inviting competitive bids. All deviations were approved by the accounting 
officer despite the fact that all conditions dictated invitations of competitive bids (Auditor 
General 2016).The same patterns was evident in the procurement process during the 
next year despite the strict requirements of treasury regulations. This non-compliance 
led to an irregular expenditure totalling R490 977 016 (Auditor General 2017).
Over payment of employee costs sky-rocketed by R724 923 000, there was a funding 
gap of R10.9b funding gap. This because budgeted funds were taken up by salaries, 
meaning that debt was accumulated substantially (Auditor General 2017).
Corruption was declared by the Provincial MEC as a key factor in the dire situation within 
the Department and a direct result of weak organisational structures and processes. The 
number of finalised cases of corruption, leading to dismissal or jail sentences, appears 
below in the Corruption Index (Gauteng Provincial Department of Health 2017).
CONCLUSION
The article, thought to be the first attempt to produce an Evidence-based Corruption 
Index in South Africa and the African Continent was based on an exhaustive study and 
critical analysis of the relevant literature. It is an extremely contested terrain of debates 
and contradictions given the diversity of opinions, empirical and theoretical challenges 
and different schools of thoughts.
The Corruption Index that resulted was founded upon primary and secondary sources 
utilising doubly corroborated South African information data and for this particular 
case study comprehensive categorisation of levels and general and specific acts of 
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corruption outlining key elements of the Index as an integral part of the gist of corrupt 
categorisation.
The Evidence–based Corruption Index presented as a result was based on objective in-
dicators; output-based corruption indicators, i.e. de facto indicators; experience-based 
indicators; integrity governance management; composite indicators and input-based cor-
ruption indicators. 
The findings of the Index were based solely on objective indicators; output-based cor-
ruption indicators, i.e. de facto indicators; experience-based indicators; integrity gover-
nance management; composite indicators and input-based corruption indicators. 
The corruption acts identified in the Index based on the number of finalised cases of 
corruption, leading to dismissal or jail sentences as well as the almost frightening figures 
and acts presented by the country’s Auditor General confirm as correct the declaration 
of the political Head of the Provincial Health Department pointing out that corruption is 
a key factor shaping the realities facing the institution.
Human greed, avarice, lack of accountability and un-ethical behaviour as well weak 
organisational structures and processes are the root causes of the existing situation.
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